I argue that judgements of what is 'true in a fiction' presuppose the Reality Assumption: the assumption that everything that is (really) true is fictionally the case, unless excluded by the work. By contrast with the more familiar Reality Principle, the Reality Assumption is not a rule for inferring implied content from what is explicit. Instead it provides an array of realworld truths that can be used in such inferences. I claim that the Reality Assumption is essential to our ability to understand stories, drawing on a range of empirical evidence that demonstrates our reliance on it in narrative comprehension. However, the Reality Assumption has several unintuitive consequences, not least that what is fictionally the case includes countless facts that neither authors nor readers could (or should) ever consider. I argue that such consequences provide no reason to reject the Reality Assumption. I conclude that we should take fictions, like non-fictions, to be about the real world.
Introduction
Readers of fiction are adept at understanding what is 'fictionally true' even though this goes well beyond what the text makes explicit. We know that Candide has blood in his veins rather than oatmeal and that Sethe cannot become invisible at will, although the relevant works never say so. We also recognize fictional truths that contradict the explicit text. We know that 6 or delusional. The Reality Assumption captures this intuition by instructing us to take for granted that everything that obtains in reality is storified, adjusting this presumption only as needed.
The most familiar reason for adjustment is explicit, reliable content that contradicts reality. The opening line of Austen's Emma mentions a certain Emma Woodhouse, who is 'handsome, clever, and rich', inviting us to include a representation of Emma in the imagined storyworld. Since Emma never actually existed, this means departing from the ontology of the real world. Still, because Emma is human, we take for granted that she is like real human beings in having arms and legs, relationships with other people, and so forth. Other works demands more radical departures. The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy is populated by numerous aliens, outlandish events, and fantastic technologies. Still, we take Adams to be providing a fanciful vision of the real universe, so that we can assume that whatever aspects of reality remain consistent with other story-truths are themselves storified and draw inferences accordingly. The Reality Assumption does not tell us how to make such inferences. Instead, it supplies an array of story-truths-that human beings have arms and legs and so on-which, in combination with other storified content, can form the basis of inferences to further story-truths.
How we make and justify these inferences is one focus of standard accounts of truth in fiction. These accounts typically assume that the explicit text directly generates certain story-truths from which others may be inferred. The challenge is then specifying principles or rules that underpin inferences from the former-call these the primary story-truths-to the latter, or implied story-truths [Walton 1990: 142] . Now, there are good reasons to doubt that any story-truths are directly generated by the explicit content of a work, the most obvious of which is the possibility of unreliable narration. 9 My own view is that we take as a defeasible presumption that some sentences of a text are constitutive of what is storified, adjusting this presumption where we detect unreliability. 10 But what matters for present purposes is that accounts of fictional truth identify some set of basic story-truths from which others are generated. Then they ask which principles justify the inferences from the one to the other.
Motivated by the same considerations behind the Reality Assumption, many theorists have suggested some version of what Walton [1990: 144] dubs the Reality Principle. Here is one:
(RP) If p 1 , …, p n are the primary story-truths, q is storified-that is, we are invited to imagine that q-if and only if, were it the case that p 1 , …, p n , it would be the case that q.
11
The idea is that we hold the primary story-truths fixed and ask what the real world would be like if they obtained. The implied story-truths are those that would also obtain in those circumstances. The counterfactual conditional is interpreted to mean that a possible world in which both the primary story-truths and q are true is closer to the actual world than one in which primary story-truths are true and q is false [ibid.: 145] . This is how the Reality Principle conforms to the principle of minimal departure.
It is widely recognized that the Reality Principle, formulated as RP, cannot be a universal inference rule for implied story-truths. One problem is that it treats primary storytruths as the only reason for departures from reality. Genre considerations may provide 9 See Walton [1990: 170-174] for an array of other reasons. 10 Story-truths can be directly generated by other features of the work as well; for instance, we may take the classification as a ghost story to establish directly (but defeasibly) the fictional existence of ghosts. Challenges to the Reality Principle usually lead philosophers to formulate alternative principles of generation. For instance, they propose that we draw inferences from the primary story-truths consistently with the beliefs prevalent in the author's community, or that we rely
on assumptions about what a plausibly reconstructed author would intend (see sections 4-5).
There are many problems with this strategy, of which I note two. First, it is unlikely that any general principle could determine what is storified for every fiction. Our interpretive practices are too unsystematic to be captured by a single, finitely characterized rule [Walton 1990: ch. 4] . A more rational conclusion is just that the Reality Principle works in some cases 12 The example and objection were suggested by Tobias Klauk.
but not others. Second, in adopting alternative principles theorists reject not only the Reality Principle but also its motivation. In consequence they reject the Reality Assumption. This is a mistake.
The reasons so far given for questioning the Reality Principle do not apply to the Reality Assumption. 13 The Reality Assumption is not a mechanism for generating implied story-truths; it is a starting point for specifying the input into any such mechanism. According to the Reality Assumption, facts about the real world are storified not as a consequence of determining what follows from the primary story-truths, but by default. We are, from the start, invited to represent as part of the storyworld anything that obtains in the real world that does not contradict other features of the work. Importantly, any rejections will be localized.
That we exclude truths about planetary development or space travel in Hitchhiker's Guide
need not have implications for psychological explanation. We default to the assumption that familiar behaviour can be explained in the ordinary way, and we do not give that assumption up unless required to do so. In this way the Reality Assumption articulates a bias in favour of reality. It does not determine the interpretation of a work, for multiple interpretations could be consistent with both the Reality Assumption and the primary story-truths. We should not expect a philosophical account to deliver the answer to every interpretive question.
Nonetheless, the Reality Assumption provides a robust starting point for interpretation, directing us to take the real world as background when making inferences to what else is storified. I claim that by contrast with the Reality Principle, the Reality Assumption applies universally. In the next section I provide evidence for the essential role of the Reality Assumption, and in the following sections I consider objections. I argue that the criticisms misconstrue the Reality Assumption as one among other possible ways of 13 Other objections to the Reality Principle do apply to the Reality Assumption (see sections 4-5).
providing a story's background. Rather, it specifies a comprehensive, default position for which there is no alternative.
Evidence for the Reality Assumption
There is ample empirical evidence that our comprehension of stories relies on the Reality
Assumption. The activation of prior knowledge, including knowledge of ordinary facts about the world, is essential to basic comprehension, underpinning inferences that go beyond or contradict explicit content. Inferences based on prior knowledge are largely 'bottom-up' and non-strategic: prior knowledge is automatically activated as we read (see Kintsch [1998: 227-38] ). In this sense readers take the Reality Assumption as a default.
To illustrate, consider inferences concerning characters' emotions. Gernsbacher, Goldsmith, and Robertson [1992] had participants read a series of stories. In one, Tom visits the shop where his friend Joe works, then steals money from the till. Later Tom learns that
Joe was fired because of the missing money. The researchers wanted to know if readers would automatically represent the implied emotional state. After reading the story, participants read a further sentence, one version of 'It would be weeks before Tom's guilt/pride/shyness would subside'. In two experiments, participants read the target sentence more quickly when the word matched the implied emotion (guilt) than when it did not. To rule out the possibility that readers inferred the emotional state only when they read the target sentence rather than while reading, a third experiment had participants read the original stories without the target sentences. They were then asked to pronounce a printed word as fast as they could. Although pronunciation is a cognitive task unrelated to comprehension, participants were systematically slower in pronouncing target words that mismatched the implied emotion than those that matched. Their prior knowledge had already been activated. Haenggi, Gernsbacher, and Bolliger [1994] replicated the results of the first two experiments for both emotional and spatial inferences. Significantly, they found that readers with low and high comprehension skills, or with greater and lesser empathic tendencies or spatial imagery ability, exhibited the same pattern of responses. The researchers concluded that making online inferences about emotion or location 'is a relatively effortless process that is rather driven by familiar knowledge about emotional states and spatial relations than by cognitive abilities ' [ibid.: 93] . In other words, we rely on the Reality Assumption automatically and unreflectively in the ordinary course of reading. Notice that this is so regardless of the mechanism for generating implied content. We would draw the same conclusion about Tom's emotional state deploying the Reality Principle as we would if we were trying to determine what the (fictional or implied) author believed or intended us to infer; but only so long as we began with our ordinary knowledge of human emotion.
A different study focuses on real-world truths independently of inference. Weisberg and Goodstein [2009] had participants read three short stories, ranging from wholly realistic to very unrealistic. The participants then judged whether a series of true statements that 'were not mentioned in any of the stories and had no bearing on any of the events or characters in the stories' also obtained in the storyworlds [ibid.: 72] . The statements reported facts about mathematics ('2+2=4'), science ('People have hearts'), social conventions ('It is rude to pick one's nose'), and contingent reality ('Washington, D.C., is the capital of the United States').
Overall, the more realistic the story and the less contingent the fact, the more likely participants judged it as storified. Participants took approximately three quarters of the mathematical and scientific truths to obtain in the realistic storyworld. For the other stories mathematical facts were judged storified at the same rate, whereas only around half of scientific facts were judged storified. Even in the least realistic story readers judged as storified over a quarter of the conventional facts. In other words, the participants consistently assumed that some real-world facts obtained in fiction, although they were sensitive to the kind of fact and the realism of the story.
If the Reality Assumption constitutes a starting point for interpretation, the more a story requires us to reject real-world assumptions, the harder it should be to comprehend. A number of critics have put forward such reasons in arguments against the Reality Principle. If their objections are successful, perhaps we must adopt an alternative starting point for interpretation. In the final two sections I consider these objections, reformulated to target the Reality Assumption.
Alternative Backgrounds
According to the Reality Assumption, we take the real world to provide the background to every story. Critics object that this approach treats every story as realistic. As noted above, He rose, strode to the console of his mood organ. "Instead of saving," he said, "so we could buy a real sheep, to replace that fake electric one upstairs. A mere electric animal and me earning all that I've worked my way up to through the years." At his console he hesitated between dialing for a thalamic suppressant (which would abolish his mood of rage) or a thalamic stimulant (which would make him irked enough to win the argument). [Dick 1968: 4] A few pages into the novel, the reader cannot yet understand how people control their moods with a console or why they would have electric sheep. However, she can already infer that a real sheep is more valuable, and she can understand Deckard's anger and the temptation of A different objection is that the Reality Assumption divorces a story from its originating context. Suppose that in a society where everyone believes that the earth is flat, someone tells a story that ends with a ship's sailing beyond the horizon [Walton 1990: 151] .
Nothing in the story specifies the fate of the ship or the shape of the earth. If we take the Reality Assumption as our starting point, it seems we should take it as storified that the earth is round and infer that the ship sails safely on. Yet the original audience would have concluded otherwise. 15 Perhaps our default position should be not that the background is the real world as we take it to be, but as the author and intended audience took it to be. Such is just, women are inferior to men, or tyranny is the best form of government [Walton 1990: 154] . We might be willing to treat such claims as storified when they are explicit or essential to understanding the plot, but the Mutual Belief Assumption suggests that a society's belief system is sufficient to generate these story-truths by itself.
It is more plausible that we draw on information about societal beliefs only when some aspect of a story cannot adequately be understood without it. This is how we read nonfiction written long ago or far away. Sometimes our ignorance of the author's context prevents us from understanding her representation of the world, although we take for granted that the work is about the same reality we inhabit. To construct an appropriate representation of the storyworld, we might need to reject real-world truths for some aspects of the story. But such rejection will be localized. And given the Reality Assumption, we resist abandoning the truth unless we must do so to understand or appreciate a story.
Irrelevant Story-Truths
Perhaps the most compelling objection to the Reality Assumption is that it storifies a glut of irrelevancies. It will be storified in Voltaire's Candide that there was a major California earthquake in 1906, that the Higgs boson is responsible for all of the mass in the universe, and that I cannot do without my morning coffee. Indeed every story will include vast collections of remote facts immaterial to the narrative. Not only will these be unknown to the author, many will remain unknown to any potential audience. It follows that storyworlds will be determinate in surprising respects. If it is true that Emma Hamilton had exactly N hairs on her head and no feature of a narrative contradicts this-as would be the case, for example, in any narrative that never mentions Hamilton-then it is storified in that narrative that she had exactly N hairs on her head. This result seems to conflict with the intuitive incompleteness of storyworlds (see section 1).
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These consequences do not undermine the Reality Assumption. First, adopting the Reality Assumption does not entail that stories are determinate in every respect. It is storified 17 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting I discuss incompleteness in more detail. The example is due to Richard Woodward (in correspondence).
in Gulliver's Travels that Gulliver's eyes are either blue or not blue; but because the text is silent on the issue, we are invited to imagine neither disjunct. This does not imply any kind of metaphysical incompleteness. Rather, it indicates a limit on how much a representation can specify that we imagine. The Reality Assumption supplements the story, but does not fill every gap.
Second, story-truth entails an invitation to imagine, not an obligation. Readers cannot imagine everything that is storified: given limitations on working memory capacity, they cannot consider all aspects of the storyworld. would motivate us to deny that she had precisely the number of hairs on her head that she did have, or to insist that it was indeterminate, if the question came up. In practice such questions rarely arise, nor should they. Rather than excluding irrelevant story-truths we simply ignore them, treating them as background and focusing instead on those story-truths that are relevant to appreciation [Walton 1990: 148] . Why certain story-truths and not others count as relevant is an issue to which I return below.
It must be conceded that reports of story content typically exclude backgrounded information. One is unlikely to say, 'In Candide, San Francisco had an earthquake in 1906'.
It would, though, be equally odd to declare that the Higgs boson gives particles mass in Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. Yet we do not doubt that the events and individuals in his history obey the laws of physics. That readers make the same assumption for fiction is borne out by the Weisberg and Goodstein experiment discussed above.
Participants had little trouble making discriminating judgements concerning the story-truth of statements that were entirely irrelevant to the narratives, including mathematical and scientific truths.
These story-truths are unlikely to enhance our understanding of most narratives. Some philosophers therefore argue that we should restrict what is storified to the content that an informed reader would think that an author-not necessarily the actual author, but a fictional or ideal version of the author constructed in interpretation-believed [Currie 1990: ch. 2] , intended readers to imagine [Byrne 1993 ], or intended to be part of the story [Phillips 1999 ].
The thought is that our comprehension of stories is much like our comprehension of other forms of communication, wherein we seek to understand what someone else aims to get across.
The communicative approach is unsatisfactory, however. First, it is difficult in advance to determine which truths might contribute to the appreciation of a work. For example, Voltaire describes the aftermath of the (real) Lisbon earthquake of 1755 in Candide,
where it provides one of many counterexamples to the thesis that this is the best of all possible worlds. That the Lisbon earthquake was followed by more damaging earthquakes in later centuries may well be relevant to our evaluation of Voltaire's argument. We should therefore reject attempts to restrict the story-truths to a narrower class than those determined by the Reality Assumption. That it is strange to report certain story-truths, such as that the Higgs boson is responsible for the mass of particles in Candide or Decline and Fall, can easily be explained by our purposes in talking about stories. Our usual aim is to describe the situations and events that contribute most directly to the plot, those that are foregrounded rather than the multitude of backgrounded story-truths. The foregrounded story-truths are those that enhance understanding and appreciation of the work: these are the ones we are prescribed to imagine.
This observation prompts another objection, namely that adopting the Reality Assumption renders the notion of story-truth irrelevant to any interesting questions about literature. 19 There is a distinction between the story-truths as defined here and what is in an intuitive sense 'part of the story', and it is only the latter we care about. 20 I do not disagree.
However, the difficulty lies not with the Reality Assumption, but with the notion of storytruth itself. We need not think that contemplation of Lemuel Gulliver's internal organs is significant to appreciation to recognize that he has them; denying that he does would be perverse. The same applies to many of the examples that standardly appear in philosophical discussions of fictional truth. When Lewis [1983: 268] points out that Sherlock Holmes does not have a third nostril and has never visited the moons of Saturn, he is not claiming that these story-truths matter to our appreciation of Conan Doyle's tales.
If we want to circumscribe a narrower domain of relevant story-truths, we should not reject the Reality Assumption. Instead we should limit how we apply the test for invitations to imagine. First, we can restrict the circumstances in which we raise the question of whether or not a particular proposition is storified to cases where we are attempting to understand some feature of the work, thereby excluding idle speculation-or philosophical arguments. In interpreting Hamlet's state of mind, questions about the causes and symptoms of depression are appropriate, whereas questions about stars in a nebula are (probably) not. If the latter questions are not permitted to arise, facts about nebulae will not be treated as relevant.
Second, we can place constraints on when we must choose between imagining that P and imagining that not-P. Perhaps we are required to choose only when the decision has implications for other interpretive issues. The Higgs boson example is a case in point:
denying that the basic laws of physics apply in Candide would dramatically change the genre.
Assuming that no such consequence would follow if one denied that Emma Hamilton had N hairs on her head, we may exclude consideration of her hair in focusing on what is relevant.
Although these restrictions make perfect sense, it is difficult in the abstract to say which truths will contribute to appreciation and therefore arbitrary to limit what is storified.
I conclude that the objections do not undermine the Reality Assumption. We have good reason to take it to specify a default position in interpretation. Not only do readers adopt the Reality Assumption in practice, no other way of supplying the background to a fiction has the same scope.
This conclusion raises an intriguing question: what explains the default status of the Reality Assumption? The simplest explanation is that in reading we take works of fiction, like works of non-fiction, to be about the real world-even if they invite us to imagine the world to be different from how it actually is. As already noted, imagining a storyworld does not mean directing one's imagining toward something other than the real world; it is instead a mental activity that involves constructing a complex representation of what a story portrays.
So the fact that we imagine storyworlds provides no motivation for severing fiction from reality. Indeed the motivation is all on the other side. If works of fiction do not concern reality, we must face serious puzzles about how we learn from fictions and why we care about the characters that populate them. Rather than try to bridge that gap, I propose that we deny its existence. If fictions are about the real world, the question is rather why imagining our world in different ways can engage and enlighten us. This is a far more fruitful question to pursue. 21 
